||Outline: Panel speakers and open discussion regarding the diminished relevance of all non-Chinese nations in rare earth related material science (possibly expanded to all areas where China dominates research and application). These measures include, but are not limited to, patent development and commercial applications in the field of rare earth dependent technologies for all non-Chinese nations.
The United States, Japan, Korea, the EU and the rest of the world have found themselves dependent on China for rare earths and rare earth value added products.
The Chinese global rare earth monopoly dominates the rest of the world at all levels, from resource production, to metallurgy, to new material science applications, to new patent filings. This translates into near exclusive commercial development of rare earth dependent components, products and, in some cases, entire industries.
The non-Chinese world’s contribution to rare earth related material science developments and commercial applications is shrinking in the rear view mirror of the Chinese colossus.
Background: With China dominating the production and internal consumption of at least 85 percent of all value added rare earth materials, in a politically saturated environment motivated to maintain techno-economic leadership, China will naturally continue to lead the world in future material science developments.
China's control over the supply of metals, alloys, magnets and other value added materials has been used to force non-Chinese technology companies to locate the production of rare earth dependent components, product lines, entire industries and research and development research centers inside China. This only feeds the compounding cycle of dominance and control.
As rare earth related technology applications continue to migrate to China does this undermine the national & economic rationale for continued public research funding, assuming that public funding is ultimately based on economic returns to the originating national economy?
The question above is also relevant to private investment. If China continues to capture most of the commercial gains related to material science applications, outside international laws and expectations of intellectual property owners, is continued private investment in this field economically rational?
To put another way, If China ultimately develops most or all rare earth dependent products and technologies does it make sense for the rest of the world to carry the cost of research for them?
Is there an unspoken tradeoff that the non-Chinese world is actually just outsource the resulting pollution and environmental degradation to China?
Have we crossed the tipping point where continued work in this area acts as a subsidy to China's economy and national, industrial and defense policy?
How does the non-Chinese world compete with this state sponsored juggernaut?
This panel will explore the questions above, including a discussion on potential remedies and solutions.